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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with 
nominal rigidities for the U.K. economy.  The model we estimate is due to Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and has become a benchmark, matching important 
aspects of the U.S. data while also being derived from optimizing behavior. 
 
Interest in DSGE modeling of the United Kingdom has been heightened in recent years 
with the introduction into the U.K. monetary policy process of the Bank of England 
Quarterly Model (BEQM), which is based to a considerable degree on explicit optimizing 
foundations; see Harrison, Nikolov, Quinn, Ramsay, Scott, and Thomas (2005) for the 
model, and Pagan (2005) for a discussion.  BEQM is, however, dissimilar in important 
respects from the Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans (CEE) model of the U.S. and the variant 
of the CEE model that Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate for the euro area.  These 
dissimilarities make it difficult to use BEQM to compare the structure of the U.K. 
economy with that of other economies.  For example, the estimation procedure for 
BEQM is different from both that used by CEE or Smets-Wouters; portions of the BEQM 
model are estimated over a considerably shorter sample than CEE consider for the U.S.; 
and there are deviations from explicit optimization in the dynamics of the BEQM model. 
 
All in all, it is probably fair to say that there has been considerably less work done for the 
U.K. in terms of DSGE modeling with systems estimation than there has been for the 
other economies.  But U.K. data may contain a type of information that is ideal for 
estimation of a DSGE model—specifically, information on private sector responses to 
policy actions.  As the present Governor of the Bank of England observed some 30 years 
ago, 
 
  Maintenance of the existing order and existing rates produces no information, whereas 
more information can be obtained by making changes.  In this respect the U.S.…  is at a 
disadvantage by comparison with the U.K.  A good illustration of this is afforded by the 
excitement generated amongst American economists in the 1960s by the investment tax 
credit and the attempts to assess its effects.  A British economist would have shrugged 
this off as a mere trifle compared to the changes he had witnessed over the years.  
(King, 1977, p. 6). 
 
This observation, though made with reference to the changes wrought in U.K. fiscal 
policy up to the 1960s, applies tenfold to monetary policy experience in the period since   2
the 1960s.  Over that period the United Kingdom has undergone great variation in 
inflation, interest rates, and monetary regime.
1 It is true that for estimation this is a mixed 
blessing, because large regime changes make it problematic to estimate a structural 
model over a long sample.  But Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and Sims and 
Zha (2006) argue for the United States that constant-parameter policy reaction functions 
may be reasonable approximations even over long samples, a view also implicit in CEE’s 
(2005) choice of a 1965−1995 estimation period.  In modeling the U.K. using a DSGE 
model, we make a compromise between these positions by treating the period since 1979 
as a single regime,




This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the model.  Section 3 presents 
estimates for our main sample.  Section 4 presents results for the longer sample and 
discusses other regime-change issues.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Model 
 
The model is the same as that in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), by now 
standard in the DSGE literature.  The model incorporates both nominal frictions (sticky 
prices and wages) and dynamics in preferences and production (habit formation in 
consumption, investment adjustment costs, and variable capital utilization).  The pattern 
of timing in agents’ decisions is consistent with the VAR identification restriction that we 
use in Section 3 below.  In our outline here of the linearized version of the model, all 
variables are expressed in log-deviations from their steady-state values.  For convenience, 
model parameters and variables are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Prices are governed by Calvo (1983) contracts, augmented by indexation to the previous 
period’s inflation rate for those firms not allowed to reoptimize their pricing decision.  
The implied inflation dynamics are given by the following Phillips curve: 
                                                 
1 Various advantages of the U.K. data for testing macroeconomic hypotheses have been stressed by Ravn 
(1997) (evaluating a real business cycle model against the behavior of U.K. real aggregates), Nelson and 
Nikolov (2004) (using a small New Keynesian model to evaluate different U.K. policy regimes), and 
Benati (2004) (assessing the behavior of U.K. data moments over the postwar period). 
2 Some work for the U.K. (e.g. Castelnuovo and Surico, 2006) focuses on 1992 as the start of the present 
policy regime.  But our use of a baseline sample period that starts in the late 1970s matches the choices 
implied by some of the BEQM equation estimation periods (see e.g. Harrison et al, 2005, pp. 115−120).  
3 The long-sample estimates are the U.K. analogue to Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters’ (2005) 
treatment of the U.S. sample 1954−2004 as a single regime (including an unchanged inflation target).   3
Table 1. Parameters in model 
 
PARAMETER D ESCRIPTION P ARAMETER D ESCRIPTION 
β     discount factor  ξp     degree of price stickiness 
α 
   production elasticity with
   respect to capital  ξw     degree of wage stickiness 
δ     depreciation rate  1/k  
   elasticity  
   of investment to l
Κ' p  
μ 
   steady-state 
   money growth rate  1/σa 
   elasticity  
   of utilization to ˆ
k r  
ψl  
   relative weight 
   of leisure in utility  ρ 
   interest-rate smoothing   
   parameter 
ψq  
   relative weight 
   of real balances in utility rπ 
   interest-rate response 
   to inflation 
λw     wage markup  ry 
   interest-rate response 
   to output 
1/σq 
   interest semielasticity 
   of money demand  rΔπ 
   interest-rate response to 
   change in inflation 
b     habits parameter  rΔy 
   interest-rate response to  
   change in output 
λf     price markup  σε 
   standard deviation 
   of monetary policy shock 
 
 
Table 2. Variable definitions 
 
VARIABLE D ESCRIPTION V ARIABLE D ESCRIPTION 
ˆ m      real money supply  ˆ π      inflation 
ˆ q  
   households’ 
   demand for money  ˆ w     real wage 
ˆ k      capital services  ˆ
k r      rental rate on capital 
ˆ k      physical capital  ˆ μ 
   growth rate of 
   nominal money stock 
ˆ l      labor 
l
Κ' p      price of capital 
c       consumption  ˆ
C U   marginal utility of consumption 
ˆ i      investment  ˆ R      nominal interest rate 
ˆ y      output        
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Here, hats on variables indicate the log-deviations from steady-state values.  For the 
nominal interest rate and inflation terms that appear in the model, the hatted variables are 
effectively the demeaned net inflation and interest rates, since the log-deviations are 
computed using gross rates. 
 
Nominal wages are staggered along similar lines to prices,
4 with a clause for indexation 
to the preceding period’s price inflation.  This produces the nominal wage equation: 
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4 See Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) for the development of this form of staggered wage contracts.   5
Firms’ optimality conditions imply that their total payments for capital services equal 




ttt t t rkw Rl + =++    (3) 
 
Underlying this condition is the assumption that firms finance their wage bill with funds 
borrowed one period earlier.  Real unit labor costs are therefore (in log terms) equal to 
the sum of the real wage and the short-term nominal interest rate. 
 
The typical household’s intertemporal Euler equation for consumption and first-order 
condition for capital purchases are respectively: 
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  (5). 
 
Because of habit formation in preferences, the household marginal utility of consumption 
that appears in the above expressions is not a static function of consumption.  Instead, it 
depends on the current, prior, and expected future levels of consumption: 
 
() ( ) ( )
2
1, 1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1 β 1 β 1 β 0 tC t t t t t t bb E U b E c b E c b c −− + − − −− − + + − =     (6). 
 
The economy’s technology allows additional productive services to be generated, at a 
cost, from an unchanged stock of physical capital.  The degree of capital utilization—i.e., 
the difference between the physical capital stock (denoted by an overbar) and capital 
services—is chosen by households to equate marginal cost with marginal benefit: 
 






−− −=     (7), 
 where 1/σa is the elasticity of the utilization function. 
 
The equilibrium condition for household investment choices can be written as 
 
l ( ) ( ) 11 11 1 Κ', β tt t t tt t t Ep E E κι ι κι ι −+ −− − =− − −      (8). 
   6
This condition indicates that the price that firms pay for capital services is a function of 
two parameters that emerge from the behavior of households (who are the producers and 
suppliers of capital services): the households’ discount factor β, and 1/κ, the elasticity of 
their investment adjustment cost function. 
 
The stock of physical capital obeys the law of motion: 
 
() 1
ˆˆ 1 δδ t tt kk ι + = −+     (9). 
 
In equation (9), δ denotes the depreciation rate.  Though physical investment is subject to 
adjustment costs, equation (9) indicates that a unit of investment adds to the physical 
capital stock in a standard manner. 
 










⎡ ⎤ =− + ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
   (10), 
a condition which indicates the standard choice between holding money for the 
transaction services it provides
5 and instead holding one-period securities for interest 
income.  
 
The following identity relates growth of nominal money supply to inflation and changes 
in real money supply: 
 
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ μπ tt t t mm −− = −+    (11). 
 
The aggregate demand for money in the economy comes from two sources: demand by 
firms, to pay for their wage bill, and by households as given in condition (10).  In 
equilibrium, total money demand is equal to the aggregate money stock: 
 
 l ( )  l ( ) = μμ tt t tt qq wl w l m m ++ +     (12) 
 
The resource constraint and the aggregate production function can be written as: 
 
                                                 
5 Because of habit formation, prior and expected future transactions create a demand for real balances 
money over and above the demand generated by current transactions.   7
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Equation (13) indicates that resources this period can be consumed, invested, or used to 
generate additional capital utilization.  Equation (14) indicates that the two inputs in 
production are labor and capital services. 
 
Monetary policy follows a dynamic version of the Taylor rule: 
 
l l ()    ( )   ( ) 1 1 πΔ π Δ y 1 ρ 1 ρπ π π ε tt tt t yt tt t RR r r yr r y y − − − ⎡⎤ =+ − ++ − + − − ⎣⎦   (15) 
 
The short-term nominal interest rate is therefore a smoothed function of inflation, output, 
and changes in inflation and output.  There is also a monetary policy shock, εt.  This rule 
is similar to that in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and 
Williams (2005). 
 
Other than our use of an interest-rate rule, the model we use corresponds to the CEE 
benchmark.  A limitation in our application to the U.K. data is that the CEE model is 
closed-economy.  But there are several reasons for using a closed-economy model when 
analyzing the U.K; see Neiss and Nelson (2003) for a discussion.  For the present paper, 
the main reasons why a closed-economy of the DSGE model might be suitable for the 
U.K. are: (a) openness makes it difficult to model capital formation endogenously, 
whereas the presence of endogenous capital is a key feature of the CEE model; (b) the 
simplest open-economy models give counterfactual weight to the exchange rate in CPI 
inflation dynamics; and once the exchange-rate channel is “tamed” by such approaches as 
assuming incomplete pass-through, imported intermediates, etc., the model’s properties 
become more like those of a closed economy (see e.g. Obstfeld, 2002). 
 
3.  Estimation 
 
To estimate the model, we first obtain data responses to a monetary policy shock from a 
VAR for the United Kingdom.  Then, as in CEE (2005), we match these impulse 
responses as closely as possible with the CEE model, using a minimum-distance   8
estimation procedure.
6 Our analysis here is limited to monetary policy shocks, but there is 
evidence for the U.S. that estimates of the CEE model are robust to incorporating 
technology shocks into the analysis (see DiCecio, 2005, and Altig, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Linde, 2005). 
 
VAR estimates.  We estimate our VAR on a U.K. dataset consisting of a subset of the 
list of variables studied in the U.S. case by CEE.  Our VAR contains the logs of real 
GDP, real consumption,
7 real investment, and labor productivity, as well as the nominal 
Treasury bill rate and the quarterly (retail) inflation rate.
8 These choices imply a focus 
upon the response to a monetary policy shock of the policy rate, inflation, and aggregate 
demand, as well as the split of aggregate demand among its components, and the division 
of the output response between labor and other inputs.  The sample period is 1979 
Q2−2005 Q4.  The start date is the quarter corresponding to the period (May 1979) in 
which the Thatcher Government first took office, and so an important monetary policy 
regime change.
9 It also corresponds approximately to the date of some other significant 
changes in government policy that are important for the VAR responses, as we discuss in 
Section 4. 
 
Figure 1 plots the estimated VAR responses to a monetary policy shock and their 
bootstrapped confidence intervals, along with the match to each response made by our 
estimates of the CEE model; the model-based responses are the red lines.  Parameters 
fixed in estimation are given in Table 3. 
 
Parameter estimates.  The parameter estimates resulting from this matching of impulse 
responses are given in Table 4.
10 Standard errors for the parameter estimates appear in 




                                                 
6 This procedure was also used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) with a smaller VAR. 
7 We have not split consumption between durables and nondurables.  VAR impulse responses in Aoki, 
Proudman, and Vlieghe (2002, Chart 2), using a different VAR specification and sample period from ours, 
found similar response functions for the two types of consumption. 
8 Our VAR does not include a time trend.  Impulse responses look similar regardless of whether a linear 
trend is included in the VAR. 
9 See e.g. Goodhart (1989) for a perspective on this regime change. 
10 “The number of impulse response steps we use is 25.  In principle, the step number could be chosen by 
statistical criteria: see Hall, Inoue, Nason, and Rossi (2007).  We use a diagonal matrix to weight the 
responses. 
11 See Newey and McFadden (1994, p. 2145).   9
  




Table 3. Parameters fixed in estimation 
 
PARAMETER V ALUE 
β  (1.04)
−1/4 
α  0.36 
δ  0.025 
μ  1.017 
ψl   s.t. l = 1 









   10
 
Table 4.  Baseline model estimates  
Sample period 1979 Q2−2005 Q4 
Private sector parameters 
b  0.7739 
(0.0013) 
λf  2.2681 
(0.0323) 
ξp  0.9371 
(0.0004) 
ξw  0.0000 
(0.0083) 
κ  16.4333 
(0.1750) 
σa  ∞  
(—) 
Monetary policy rule parameters 
ρ  0.8720 
(0.0907) 
rπ  1.2813 
(0.4977) 
ry  0.3517 
(0.6065) 
rΔπ  −0.5129 
  (0.6971) 
rΔy  0.4259 
(0.2759) 
σR  0.1564 
(0.0001) 
 
   11
The parameter indexing habit formation in consumption is larger than that estimated by 
CEE (2005) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005), but is basically in line 
with Fuhrer (2000).  So the degree of habit formation in the U.K. appears similar to U.S. 
estimates. 
 
The markup estimate is, at somewhat above 2, high by the standards of calibrated and 
estimated DSGE models.  It is, however, roughly in line with the estimate of the average 
U.K. gross markup (in manufacturing) by Haskel, Martin, and Small (1995, p. 30) of 2.0.  
Our high markup estimate is also made more standard by taking into account that it 
should be regarded as the wedge between consumer prices and (principally) nominal 
wages,
12 including the impact of cost elements we have not modeled explicitly.
13 At the 
back of one’s mind it should be remembered that the model is an abstraction of a model 
with imported intermediate goods and indirect taxes.  With these unmodeled elements 
built into the empirical price level series, the estimated markup of retail prices on 
nominal wages is increased.
14 
 
The estimated interest-rate policy rule has responses to both the level and growth rate of 
inflation as well as to the deviation of output from steady state.  Because the 
interpretation of the inflation responses is affected by the output response, we deal with 
the latter response first.  As technology shocks are held constant, any output movements 
reflect opening up of the output gap and so inflationary pressure.  It is precisely this type 
of output variation that a monetary authority will have greatest interest in stabilizing.  
This may account for the output response being larger than is usual in estimated interest-
rate rules, which typically do not remove from the output measure the variation that is 
due to technology shocks. 
 
The monetary policy reaction to inflation consists of a standard level response and a 
negative response to the change in inflation.  We find that the inflation-change response, 
while not very precisely estimated, is negative and economically sizable.  Under some 
parameter values, an estimated negative response to the change in inflation implies that 
policymakers have lagged inflation rather than current inflation in their rule.  Our 
estimated rΔπ response is, however, too large (in absolute value) for this to be the case.  
                                                 
12 Interest on the nominal wage bill also enters the cost expression, with implications we discuss shortly. 
13 By contrast, Haskel, Martin, and Small’s (1995) markup estimate allows for costs of materials, so our 
markup estimate should be higher than theirs, other things equal. 
14 Therefore, our high estimate may be consistent with Britton, Larsen, and Small (2000)’s setting the U.K. 
steady-state markup value closer to 1.0 when calibrating a model with explicit imported intermediates.   12
Instead, policymakers actually make different-signed short-run responses to inflation, 
initially allowing a temporary reduction in the interest rate when inflation rises.  To 
understand this response, one has to keep in mind the supply side of the CEE model.  In 
the standard sticky-price model the impulse responses of output and the output gap to a 
monetary policy shock are identical, because potential output depends on real shocks 
only.  In the CEE model, however, this is not the case because interest rates enter the 
production function, implying that potential output depends on the nominal interest rate 
(see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006, for further discussion).  Holding constant its other 
effects, a cut in the interest rate stimulates potential output and so helps inflation 
stabilization in the face of upward pressure on aggregate demand.  Therefore, in the wake 
of a monetary policy shock, policymaker stabilization of the output gap and inflation 
takes a three-pronged approach: a large response to output to rein in incipient excessive 
aggregate demand (ry > 0, rΔy > 0); a short-run cut in the interest rate as inflation rises to 
stimulate potential output (rΔπ < 0); and a sizable and durable positive response of the 
interest rate to the level of inflation relative to target (rπ > 1).   
 
The estimates imply large investment adjustment costs, mainly driven by the matching of 
the smoother investment responses after the initial period; the model does not match the 
apparent initial spike in investment observed in the data.   
 
While the CEE model allows for both wage stickiness and indexation of wages to price 
inflation, our parameter estimates imply that both these features are absent.  On the other 
hand, the estimated degree of price stickiness is substantial.  Because full indexation of 
prices is superimposed upon this price adjustment, it is not appropriate to infer from the 
low implied Calvo probability that prices are implausibly rigid; rather, the indexation 
implies substantial price movements every period even with the underlying price 
stickiness.  Empirical support for lagged inflation terms in the Phillips curve, when the 
parameter governing them is estimated freely, is not universal (see e.g. Ireland, 2001), so 
our assumption of full indexation may be restrictive.  A lagged inflation term in the 
Phillips curve is, however, in line with the specification advocated by Blake and 
Westaway (1996) for U.K. monetary policy analysis. 
 
The bottom line is that the estimates suggest that an emphasis on price stickiness as 
opposed to wage stickiness is appropriate in analyzing the U.K.  This emphasis is 
consistent with evidence for other European countries, such as Coenen, Levin, and 
Christoffel’s (2007) study of nominal rigidities in Germany.   13
 
Factor utilization is not found to be important, the relevant parameter being driven to the 
boundary of its admissible region.  Our VAR productivity responses are not very 
precisely estimated, so the model can explain output variation in terms of input responses 
and so has little need to rely on the intensive margin to explain the data responses. 
 
4.  Estimates including pre-1979 data 
 
In this section we present results for the long sample 1962−2005 as well as a sample 
using only pre-1979 data.  The long-sample impulse responses and their matches are 
given in Figure 2, and those for the pre-1979 sample are given in Figure 3.  Parameter 
estimates for each sample are given in Table 5.   
 
Turning to the policy rule first, the estimates deliver substantially lower inflation 
responses in the interest-rate rule pre-1979, consistent with the assignment of inflation 
control to nonmonetary devices in the U.K. before 1979.  But the response is large 
enough even in this sample period to deliver determinacy (i.e., a single model 
equilibrium).
15 The output response is perversely signed pre-1979; this may be another 
reflection of the lack of monetary policy response to inflationary pressure since, as noted 
earlier, this coefficient denotes responses to the specific type of output increases that are 
likely to raise inflation.  An additional departure from our baseline estimates is that both 
sets of estimates that include pre-1979 data have a more standard (i.e., positive) interest-
rate response to the change in inflation. 
 
A major feature of the structural parameters when we move away from our baseline 
sample is that there is now sizable nominal wage rigidity.  Another difference from our 
baseline structural parameter estimates pertains to investment behavior.  In the pre-1979 
sample, the model cannot match the empirical investment impulse response; the best the 
model can do is to suppress investment altogether (and so generate a flat investment 
model-response in Figure 3).  Accordingly, the investment adjustment-cost parameter 
estimate becomes arbitrarily large. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Our estimation routine only considers parameter combinations that deliver a single solution.  An 
alternative procedure, which we have not pursued here, would be to consider both determinacy and 
indeterminacy regions and select a solution in the latter case using the minimal state variable procedure.   14
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated and model responses to a monetary policy shock 
Sample 1962 Q3−2005 Q4   15
 
Figure 3. Estimated and model responses to a monetary policy shock 
Sample 1962 Q3−1979 Q1 
 
   16
 
 
Table 5.  Model estimates for samples that include pre-1979 data 
 
 Sample  period 
1962 Q3−2005 Q4 
Sample period 
1962 Q3−1979 Q1 
Private sector parameters 
























Monetary policy rule parameters 
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It is tempting to suggest that our anomalous results for investment occur because the 
estimates including pre-1979 data are distorted by the existence of unmodeled breaks in 
monetary policy regime.  But this does not really provide a satisfactory answer why we 
get these particular results.  It is not obvious that estimated impulse responses over a 
sample that includes multiple regimes will be perverse in their shape; they are, more or 
less, an average of the responses observed across each regime, and so we should expect 
them to be of standard shape.  Instead of this, we get model estimates that appear to 
extinguish the investment portion of aggregate demand. 
 
It is likely instead that government policy is indeed the culprit for the anomalies in the 
pre-1979 results, but that the driving factor is not monetary policy but U.K. governments’ 
microeconomic interventions.  Before the 1980s, many large industries (e.g. steel and 
telecommunications) were principally government-owned.  What is more, in a misguided 
effort to control inflation by nonmonetary means, governments frequently intervened in 
the pricing decisions of their enterprises.  For example, George Brown, then Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, said in 1965 said that the government was operating a price-
control policy “in the field of government responsibility so far as charges for which they 
are responsible, prices which are their responsibility…”
16 Ted Heath, Prime Minister 
1970−74, said shortly before being elected that “we are going to see to it that the State 
does not put up its prices and charges with gay abandon.”
17 The attempt to enforce this 
policy led to considerable interference in government enterprises’ operations, so much so 
that Anthony Crosland, a leading Labour Party figure, cited 1970−71 as a period that 
displayed a poor “balance… between Ministerial control and entrepreneurial freedom.”
18 
 
From around 1978, however, it became much more standard for government-owned 
enterprises to base their pricing and investment decisions on market signals, with a 
government report on the subject in 1978 stating: “The Government intends that the 
nationalized industries will not be forced into deficits by restraints on their prices.”
19 The 
stepping-away by government from management of investment decisions was cemented 
by the privatization of many government enterprises in the 1980s. 
 
                                                 
16 “Brown’s Pay Policy Approved,” Glasgow Herald, October 1, 1965, page 5. 
17 Quoted in William Russell, “ ‘Pushover’ Jenkins Surrendered to Unions, Says Heath,” Glasgow Herald, 
June 3, 1970, page 8. 
18 Crosland (1974, p. 39). 
19 U.K. White Paper on Nationalized Industries, 1978, quoted in House of Commons Debates, December 5, 
1979, page 563.   18
Since the pre-1978 government interventions blocked investment from responding to 
market signals, including those from monetary policy shocks, one can understand why 
investment responses might deviate greatly from those predicted by our model, in which 
investment behavior is based on optimal firm choices.  Government prohibitions on a 
firm’s ability to raise prices might cut off funds to the firm, thus distorting investment 
decisions.  On the other hand, for given monetary policy, government intervention in 
investment decisions might merely transfer aggregate demand pressure from investment 
to other categories of spending, rather than affect total demand.  So impulse responses 
other than those for investment might still be compatible with the model, which is 




In this section we report further results regarding the robustness of our results to 
alternative data definitions (Section 5.1), and our choice of regime dates (Section 5.2). 
 
5.1 Alternative investment series 
 
The BEQM model and such sources as the Bank of England Inflation Report use a 
slightly narrower definition of investment than that we have employed.  This narrower 
definition is known as “Business Investment” (though, like our series, it includes 
investment by government enterprises).   
 
We examine the effect on our results of using this alternative investment series.  In Figure 
4 we show that using this series in our VAR makes little difference the empirical 
responses to a monetary policy shock.
20 The parameter estimates using this series are 
given in Table 6.  These are little changed from the baseline parameter estimates, with 
some important exceptions.  Most notably, the policy rule estimates are much less 
precisely estimated, and feature a much lower estimated response to output; and the 
alternative estimates give roughly equal importance to price and wage stickiness, whereas 
in the baseline estimates prices were much stickier than wages. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The sample period we now use, 1980 Q1−2005 Q4, is slightly shorter than the 1979 Q2−2005 Q4 sample 
we used for our baseline results, owing to difficulty obtaining parameter estimates for 1979−2005 with the 
business investment series.   19
5.2 VAR stability and regime breaks 
 
As noted above, our data cover the whole period 1962−2005, but our baseline structural 
estimates are based on a sample covering only the period since the late 1970s, reflecting 
the changes in U.K. industrial and monetary policies that took place around that time.  To 
investigate further the issue of regime break dates, in Table 7 we follow Boivin and 
Giannoni (2002, p. 99) by investigating the stability of the VAR when it is estimated for 
the long sample 1962 Q1−2005 Q4.  We report the p-values for the constancy of the 
coefficients associated with each group of regressors in the VAR.  The break date 
suggested by the test is also reported, and those highlighted in bold are the breaks 
carrying statistical significance at the 10% level or better. 
 
The results for the baseline VAR specification—that is, the VAR specification underlying 
the Figure 2 impulse responses—occupy the top half of the table.  The results suggest a 
significant break in the inflation equation around 1975 Q2.  This date, however, does not 
constitute a monetary policy regime break; instead, the mid-1975 instability reflects a 
one-time shock to industrial policy.  U.K. governments’ policy, described above, of 
holding down nationalized industries’ prices, underwent an adjustment in this period, 
with prices allowed to rise to eliminate the discrepancy with costs that had accumulated.  
The large impact effect on consumer prices that resulted has sometimes been categorized 
as tantamount to a substantial increase in indirect taxes (Wilson, 1984, p. 50).  The test 
statistics mechanically take this large shock as evidence of regime change, though, 
economically, it is not the sort of change in systematic policy responses that truly 
qualifies as a policy regime shift.  The remaining stability rejections are spread over 
1977−81 and so are roughly in line with our focus in estimation on a 1979 break date. 
 
Recall that our VAR does not use detrended real data, nor does it include a trend as a 
regressor.  Some work on U.S. data, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Boivin and 
Giannoni (2002), and Giannoni and Woodford (2005), detrends real variables before 
putting them in the VAR.  We report in the bottom half of Table 7 the stability results for 
our VAR when our specification is modified by replacing the four real variables with 
their detrended counterparts.  The detrending assumes that the log real variables are 
driven by a broken linear trend, with constant and trend breaks in both 1973 Q4 and 1981 
Q4. 
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Figure 4. Estimated and model responses to a monetary policy shock, with alternative 
investment series 
Sample 1980 Q1−2005 Q4   21
 
 
Table 6.  Estimates using alternative investment series  
Sample period 1980 Q1−2005 Q4 
 
Private sector parameters 
b  0.6621 
(0.0015) 
λf  2.4922 
(0.0198) 
ξp  0.8465 
(0.0020) 
ξw  0.9409 
(0.0008) 
κ  14.2684 
(0.2340) 
σa  ∞ 
(−) 
Monetary policy rule parameters 
ρ  0.8426 
(1.2144) 
rπ  2.0747 
(21.0751) 
ry  0.0546 
(1.0372) 
rΔπ  −0.2935 
  (0.0368) 
rΔy  0.4140 
(2.1327) 
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Table 7.  VAR stability tests (sample period: 1962 Q3−2005 Q4) 
 
1. Baseline VAR specification 
Regressor  Dependent 
variable  π  y c i  y − h  r 








































































2. Baseline VAR specification with y, c, i, y − h detrended 









































































Note: Values reported are the p-values for the Andrews (1993) sup-Wald test, computed using the 
procedure of Diebold and Chen (1996).  The null hypothesis is no structural breaks, while the 
alternative hypothesis is break in the constant and group of lag coefficients on the indicated 
regressor.  Each panel also gives the break-date associated with the p-value. 
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Besides continuing to show a break in 1975 in some of the inflation coefficients, these 
stability results largely reaffirm a focus on a regime break around the early 1980s 
(specifically, 1980 or 1981).  Two of the significant rejections of stability do suggest a 
break in 1984 in GDP and productivity behavior, but these rejections can be discounted 
as reflecting the temporary disturbances to output from the coalmining strike of that year. 
 
One puzzling aspect of the results with detrended variables is that the interest-rate 
equation no longer registers any significant regime break.  This, however, is not decisive 
evidence against the importance of monetary policy regime change.  For one thing,  
relatively minor and statistically insignificant changes in the VAR coefficients can imply 
large changes in the implied “long-run response” of the interest rate to endogenous 
variables.  This is the case here, since, despite the lack of rejection of stability: the VAR 
equation for the interest rate underlying the final row of the table has a long-run solution 
with an interest-rate response to (annualized) inflation of about 0.3, but this rises to 1.0 
upon restricting the sample to 1979−2005.
21 Furthermore, the inflation VAR equation 
now exhibits a significant early 1980s break, which is indirect support for a monetary 
policy regime change around that time. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have estimated the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model on 
U.K. data.  While CEE found plausible estimates on U.S. data when treating the period 
since the 1960s as a single regime, for the United Kingdom it appears that more 
satisfactory estimates emerge if pre-1979 data are excluded; otherwise, the estimates 
imply degenerate behavior of investment.  This result is consistent with policy regime 
changes being an important factor in the postwar U.K. economy.  These regime changes 
include not only shifts in the role assigned to monetary policy, but also policy changes 
that made investment decisions more closely based on market forces.  Another important 
implication of our estimates is that price stickiness, rather than wage stickiness, is the 
major source of nominal rigidity in the United Kingdom.
                                                 
21 In some contexts (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, and Rudebusch, 1998) the VAR equation for 
the interest rate coincides with the interest-rate policy rule.  This is not the case in our analysis, as the 
policy rule that we use in estimation differs from the VAR equation.  But solving the reduced-form VAR 
interest-rate equation for its long-run solution nevertheless provides a means of cross-checking the stability 
test results.   24
Appendix 1.  Data sources and definitions 
 
Nominal interest rate: U.K. Treasury bill rate, quarterly average; source: Haver-IFS, quarterly 
average series. 
 
Output: Real GDP, s.a., quarterly, series abmi.q; source: U.K. Office of National Statistics 
(ons.gov.uk), download date May 2006. 
 
Private household consumption, s.a., quarterly, series abjr.q; source: ons.gov.uk, download date 
May 2006. 
 
Investment: Gross fixed capital formation, s.a., quarterly, series npqt.q; source: ons.gov.uk, 
download date May 2006. 
 
Alternative investment series: Business investment at 2003 prices, s.a., quarterly, series npel.q; 
source: ons.gov.uk, download date August 2006. 
 
Productivity: Y/H, where H = hours worked.  Source for H: series ybus.q (source: ONS); with 
splice into Ravn (1997) U.K. hours worked series to obtain pre-1971 Q1 data. 
 
Inflation: log difference of P, where P is a seasonally adjusted consumer price series.  P was 
constructed as follows  A quarterly average of RPI was spliced into a quarterly average of RPIX 
after 1973, the series was seasonally adjusted, then tax-related spikes of 4% (in 1979 Q3) and 2% 
(1990 Q2) were removed from the series.  The seasonal regressions underlying the seasonal 
adjustment used the log-change as the dependent variable, and seasonal patterns were allowed to 
differ across 1955−1976, 1976−1986, and 1987−2005.  The source for the monthly RPI 
underlying the quarterly averages was the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) (ons.gov.uk).  
The ONS, however, provides RPIX data only from January 1987.  An unofficial RPIX series 
starting in 1974 has, however, been constructed at the Bank of England, and this series underlies 
studies such as Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Benati (2004).  The OECD-Haver service also 
provides an RPIX series (though beginning only in 1975) that closely matches this series.  We 
used the quarterly average of the unofficial RPIX series for 1974−87 and spliced it into quarterly 
average of the official RPIX series that begins in 1987.  Splicing this RPIX series at 1974 Q1 
with RPI delivered the RPI/RPIX quarterly average series underpinning P.   25
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